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Christian A. Childers and Douglas D.
Abstract-Federal wilderness fire management policies have been scrutinizedsince
catastrophic fires in
the Greater
Area in 1988. While wilderness tire management objectives are still aimed at
recreating natural fire regimes, all USDA Forest Service fire management programs must be
Since current Forest Service economic analyses do not fully
the value of fire
wilderness, a
cost-effectiveness analysis was developed to compare wilderness fire management options. The analytical
procedure is briefly reviewed, illustrated
a
California case study and case study results arc
discussed. These results suggest that containment of some tires may be more
than current
control-oriented practices.

Federal wilderness fire management policies have been
in the Greater
scrutinized since the catastrophic
Yellowstone Area in 1988.
this context, is a
tire of any size that
in excessive resource damage,
excessive suppression costs, excessive
to private
inholdings, or loss of life (Savcland 1986). No lives were
lost in Yellowstonc and many have argued the bcnctits, rather
than damages, of these
but private lands were

to the Yellowstone ecosystems,

and suppression costs were
excessive (US Senate 1988). While wilderness fire
management objectives are still aimed at recreating natural
tire regimes, all Forest Service fire management programs
must be cost-effective. If these objectives were difficult to
implement in Yellowstone, they will be even more so in
southern California, where chaparral covered wilderness areas
are often surrounded by high valued private property and
improvements. The Forest Service’s range of options to meet
these

objectives

include

the

use

of

appropriate

suppression

responses and prescribed tire.
Prescribed tires can take two forms: prescribed natural fires
and management ignited prescribed fires (USDA Forest
prescribed fires are monitored and
Service 1989).
managed through the use of detailed bum plans (USDA Forest
Service 1989). Theoretically, the only difference between the
two forms of prescribed tire is the source of the ignition, but
is also often different. Prescribed
the timing of the
natural fires are naturally occurring unplanned ignitions
usually caused by infrequent summer or fall lightning storms.
Management ignited prescribed fires are ignited by Forest
Service personnel on their own time schedule when burning
conditions and resource availabilities are optimal
fall, winter, or spring in southern California).

(usually

late
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Resources Management Department, Cal
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Any fire not classified as a prescribed tire is a wildfire and
must
an appropriate suppression response. These
range from
suppression efforts aimed at
the tire as small as possible (a control response) to
or confinement responses. Containment means
surrounding a
with minimal control lines and utilizing
natural barriers to stop its spread.
means
limiting a fire’s spread to a predetermined area principally
using natural barriers, preconstructed barriers, or

environmental conditions (USDA Forest Service 1989).

~

A cost-effectiveness analysis has been developed to compare
options for wilderness fire management programs
(Childers and Piirto 1989). In this analysis, approximating
the average annual burned area of the natural fire regime is
defined as the objective, fire gaming is used to develop
representative fire costs and sizes, and decision trees are used
to develop expected annual cost and burned area values for a
of fire management alternatives. This paper briefly
reviews the analytical procedure, illustrates the procedure
through a southern California case study (two contiguous
wilderness areas on Los Padres National Forest, Santa
Barbara, CA.), and discusses the case study results.

THE STUDY AREA
Our case study area comprises 23 1,500 acres of the Dick
Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas on Los Padres
National Forest (fig. 1). The vegetation of this area is
predominantly chaparral brush species, including
(Adenostoma sciculatum), assorted ceanothus and
species (Ceanothus spp. and
spp.), two types
of scrub oak (Ouercus dumosa and 0. turbinella) and several
other pyrophytic shrubs. The chaparral intergrades
with coast live oak [Ouercus aerifolia) in some riparian areas,
big cone Douglas fir Psuedotsuea macrocama) and digger
on some north slopes, and a variety of
pine Pinus
other pines at higher elevations. Fire is a natural component
of these ecosystems.
of
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Figure l--Los Padres National Forest, with the Dick Smith and San Rafael Wilderness Areas highlighted

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

ANALYSIS

Most Forest Service economic analyses use cost-benefit
models. For example, economic analysis of forest level fire
management programs is based on the Cost Plus Net Value
Change (C + NVC) model (USDA Forest Service 1987). C
+ NVC computes the sum of program costs and the
quantifiable (in monetary terms) effects of fire on resource
values. To be efficient, these
analyses must
on all relevant resources. C +
include the effects of
NVC models currently include
effect values for many
primary forest resources such as timber, minerals, and forage,
and wildlife
and many wilderness outputs such as water,
(measured in numbers of visits by hunters and fishermen),
and recreational use (USDA Forest Service 1987). Fire’s
effects on these resources can be and usually is much different
than its effects on a wilderness ecosystem. Since the primary
economic value of wilderness remains undefined, fire’s effects
on wilderness also remain undefined. A cost-benefit analysis
which does not include all of the relevant costs and benefits
will be incomplete, and often misleading (Williams 1973).
Therefore, analyses based solely on C + NVC models are
management planning.
inadequate for wilderness
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(1986) avoided this C + NVC problem in a
cost-effectiveness comparison of tire management options for
the Frank Church-River of No Return Wilderness Area. In
his Analysis, the costs of each alternative were the expected
annual suppression costs. “Effectiveness” was the
approximation of the average “natural” annual burned ares
based on what fire history studies revealed.
(1986)
justified this well: Plant communities require a certain amount
of fire, just as they require a certain amount of
the average annual burned area would
precipitation.
be like altering the average annual rainfall. Though
Saveland’s analysis involved a different fire regime and
setting, his definitions and much of his methodology are
appropriate for southern California’s chaparral.
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), in its truest form,
compares the costs of different alternatives, where each
alternative will meet the desired objectives, or have the same
effects. A CEA has five key elements: the objective; the
alternatives; the costs; the model; and a criterion for ranking
the alternatives (Quade 1967).

The

Objective

The most important, and
the most difficult, step in CEA
is a clear definition of the goals or the objectives. Public
policy usually includes several goals or objectives and these
are often conflicting (Quade 1982). Forest Service Policy is
no exception. The Forest Service Manual (USDA Forest
Service 1986) defines two objectives for wilderness fire
management:
1. (to) permit lightning caused fires to play, as nearly as
possible, their natural ecological role in wilderness;
2. (to) reduce to an acceptable level, the risks and
consequences of wildfire within wilderness or escaping from
wilderness.
The value of fire playing its natural ecological role is
currently unquantifiable in monetary terms; thus, it is not
included in Forest Service economic evaluations. The
consequences of fire are more straight forward. They include
resource and property damage and suppression costs. Risk,
while also difficult to quantify monetarily, is the probability
of a fire resulting in excessive resource damages or
suppression costs. Current Los Padres National Forest tire
management plans stress the second objective (reducing the
risks and consequences); proposed wildfire responses are
suppression intensive (control and contain strategies) and no
wilderness prescribed fires have been planned. The Forest’s
current wilderness fire management objective might be to
respond to and suppress each ignition at minimal cost,
regardless of annual burned area. If we are interested in
allowing lightning fire to play its natural role, this must be
included in the analysis. Our redefined objective might then
be to recreate the natural fire regime at minimal cost.
To further define this objective, we need to look at the natural
fire return interval. By defining the maximum time interval
between fires, we can determine the minimal average annual
burned area required to recreate the natural fire regime.
Research suggests that the area’s chaparral historically burned
every 30 years (Byrne 1979, Minnich 1983). Los Padres
National Forest fire records (1911-1987) suggest that the
chaparral bums every 45 years (USDA Forest Service 1988).
Forty-five years probably represents the maximum fire return
interval since these records were taken while all fires were
return interval,
being actively suppressed. Using the
study area
an average of over 5,000 acres of the 23
would have to bum annually. It is important to note that this
average is a long-term objective, not an annual
goal. In some years,
acres might bum while
in other years no prescribed fires will be implemented (just as
lightning strikes frequently in some years, while no lightning
activity occurs in other years).

The

Alternatives

Four alternatives were chosen for the Los Padres CEA.
1. Alternative 1 is the Forest Service’s past policy: Control
all wildfires regardless of cause, and attempt to meet annual
burned area objectives through prescribed burning.
2. Alternative 2 is the fire management strategy proposed in
the Los Padres’ Land Management Plan: Contain all fires
which occur under low intensity and control all moderate to
high intensity tires, while pursuing an active prescribed
burning program.
all
3. Alternative 3 (the Confinement Alternative):
low intensity starts, contain moderate to high intensity starts,
and control only the starts which occur under extreme tire
weather conditions (augmented by prescribed burning as
needed).
4. Alternative 4 (the Prescribed Natural Fire Alternative):
The same as Alternative 3, with the addition of an approved
plan for prescribed natural fire management.

The Costs
Only the relevant variable costs should be included in a CEA
(Quade 1982).
Fixed costs--those that remain the same for each
not be included. For this analysis,
costs include
suppression equipment, suppression manning
levels, and fire management Personnel,, because these
on over
forestwide resource level
fires a year and an average of less than two ignitions occur
annually in the ease study area. The variable costs that must
be considered are annual suppression costs, prescribed
costs, and
for fires originating in the study area.

The ‘Model
A model is a simplified representation of the real world which
includes all of the relevant features (Quade 1967). Decision
trees can be used to evaluate alternative fire management
programs in the face of uncertainties about future
occurrences, weather, behavior, and sizes (Hirsch and others
1981). Decision trees are used to develop expected values.
Expected values are probability weighted averages of all
possible outcomes. Expected values are not predictions of
actual future costs due to the many variables involved in
tires; they provide relative values for comparison.
For our analysis, decision tree probabilities were derived
from fire history records. The range of cost and burned area
values were developed through fire gaming since no
or comparable fire history records were available for
containment, confinement, or prescribed natural fire responses
(Childers and Piirto 1989).

181

calm
$117

Gamed
s i
4.0
4.0

Gamed
Fire
NVG

NVG

a2
El
4.5

a385

450.0
265.0

I

s7
4.4

CA
40
265.0
390.0
3.0
740.0

a2
19.0
48.3

780.0

267
35.2

5163,384

3527,336

al
164
9.6
35.5

S4.416

$621

RL2
3.0

S2887

788.0

S12

RL3
a364

so
26

0.1
0.1
0.1
833.0
40.0
835.0

al
al
a2
29.3

5.0

S3.475

748.0
$167,088
$183,371

7.4
15.7
5.3

El.318
5973,519
E.xpc&d vahla:
Figure Z-The decision tree for Alternative

74.9
9425

Management ignited prescribed fire costs were subjectively
estimated at
per acre by the garners and by the Santa
Barbara Ranger District’s Fuels Management Staff. This is
more expensive than most recent prescribed fires adjacent to
the case study wilderness areas, but initial wilderness
prescribed tires will probably be expensive due to the age and
continuity of the fuelbeds, remoteness of the fires, and
limitations on control lines and the use of mechanized
equipment in wildcmess.

A decision tree must be
for each alternative, using
the same probabilities but with different suppression responses
and thus different cost and burned area values. The
probabilities for each branch of the trees were calculated from
(I 963-87) fire history of the San Rafael and Dick
the
Smith Wilderness Areas (Childers and
1989). The
2)
decision tree for Alternative 4 of the Los Padres study
illustrates the values and probabilities which were developed
for our CEA. Alternative 4’s decision tree is presented since
it is the most complex decision tree (this is the only
in which strategy is not
based on weather
pattern).

A Criterion
The criterion for ranking alternatives depends on the agency’s
goals and objectives. Many different rankings are possible.
For this analysis, we defined our objective as the recreation
of the natural fire regime at minimal cost. Given current
budgetary constraints, minimizing costs regardless of burned
area might be the agency’s actual objective. The sources of
proposed expenditures (i.e., forest fire fighting funds vs.
program or budgeted dollars) might be important
considerations. Risk is also a concern. Finally, the ignition
source and timing of the tires might be important to
prescribed tire planners. Therefore, all of this information
must be provided.

Fire gaming is the prediction of
fire sizes by
fire management professionals. Predictions are based on the
interactions of estimated tire behavior conditions and given
suppression force responses (Harrod and Smith 1983). Our
garners included the fire management personnel from the
Forest Supervisor’s Office and from each of the three ranger
districts responsible for the case study area. The “games”
consisted of first mapping an overlay of the free-burning fire
(without any suppression efforts) for a series of time
periods. Four weather patterns were mapped at each location
and these “fires” were then controlled, contained, confined
and managed as prescribed natural tires to develop the cost
and burned area values needed to fill in each decision tree.
were calculated using
Net Resource Value Changes
the Forest’s 1988 NVC values based on acreage burned by
intensity level in each watershed (Childcrs 1991).

Table

Four weather patterns were gamed at each of four fire
set at representative fire location (RL)
locations: the
the second at RL 2, the third at RL 3, and the fourth set
under double ignition conditions (two tires occurring
2 and 4 (Childers 1991). The
simultaneously) using
results of these games are presented in table 1. These values

size and cost figures for gamed fires.
CONTROL
Size
cost
(acres)

Representative Fire Game 1
Ueather
Weather
Weather
Ueather

RESULTS

Pattern
Pattern
Pattern
Pattern

A

C
D

Representative Fire Game
Weather Pattern A
Weather Pattern
Ueather Pattern C

2

3

cost

(acres)

Size

7,693
7,900
84,592
36,989

0.5
2.0
265.0
390.0

5,113
4,722
51,730
41,403

4.0
450.0
(not
(not

0.3
70.0
145.0

3,129
40,498
86,604
366,894

0.3
780.0
780.0

2,756
47,792
93,335
527,336

3.0

8,415
7,541
18,249
370,193

0.1
0.1
10.0

4,427
4,896
9,029
910,362

3,275
44,518
136,861
851,674

0.5
785.0
800.0
2.800.0

0.1
0.1

Representative fire Game 4
Weather Pattern A
Weather Pattern
Ueather Pattern C
Weather Pattern D
2.260.0

2,903
61,549
98,496
973.519

cost

(acres)

0.5
2.0
120.0
40.0

Weather Pattern D
Representative Fire Game
Ueather Pattern A
Weather Pattern
Weather Pattern C
Weather Pattern D

(8)

CONFINE

CONTAIN

Size

(not
(not

40.0
(not

Rx Natural Fire
Size
cost

(acres)
3,095
6,530

gamed)
gamed)
2,887
163,384

gamed)
gamed)
2,525
401
17,807

gamed)

5.0
3,475
1,955.0
167,088
(not gamed)
(not gamed)

4.0
450.0

3,689
6,941

(not gamed)
(not gamed)
740.0
1,965.0

47,814
182,254

(not gamed)
(not gamed)
0.1
833.0
835.0
(not

740.0
(not

4,821
110,546
88,639

gamed)
48,227
183,371

gamed)

(not
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were then run through the appropriate alternatives’ decision
trees (as per Childers and
1989) and expected values
for average annual suppression costs, burned area, and
were calculated for each decision tree. These results are
presented in table 2.

similar, as are alternatives 3 and 4. This can be attributed to
the similarity of the containment and control responses and
the confinement and prescribed natural fire responses as they
One gamer concluded
were used on many of the gamed
that they were still “fighting” the fires, even under the
responses. For example, the actual
prescribed natural
dispatch cards of initial attack resources were used to
determine who would respond to each fire under both
containment and control; thus, many of the same resources
were used on both of these strategies. The run cards were
heavily modified for confinement and prescribed natural fire
similar.
responses, but the objectives of these two were
Once these strategies have been implemented, familiarity with
appropriate suppression responses and pre-approved
prescribed fire bum plans should lead to greater differences in
their results. Despite the similarities, these results do provide
some valuable information for the decisionmaker.

Table 3 includes a breakdown of annual suppression costs and
acreage into prescribed
and forest fire fighting (FFF)
costs. Table 3 also illustrates the prescribed bum acreage and
average
costs that would be required to meet our
annual burned area objective under each alternative. All cost
values are presented in 1988 dollars.

DISCUSSION
One of the most obvious observations from the decision tree
results (table 2) and the total cost of implementing each
alternative (table 3) is that alternatives 1 and 2 are very

Table 2--Average annual
and prescribed natural fire cost, cost and
San Rafael Wilderness Areas highlighted per acre managed, average annual
burned area, and average annual cost per area burned for four alternative
fire management programs for the Dick Figure
decision tree for
Alternative 4 Smith and San Rafael Uilderness Areas

Average
annual
cost

Cost

per
acre
managed

Average
annual
burned
area
(acres)

Average
annual
cost per
burned
acre

Historical
Alternative

Alternative

Table
and burned

1

9197,611

$0.85

394.8

$500.53

2

9195,474

SO.84

447.2

$437.11

3

8334,773

$1.45

$211.88

4

8341,586

$1.48

$205.92

areas

by

of total
source

average

annual

A

Acreage:

1

L

suppression/management

T

E

R
2

N

A

T
3

I

costs

V

E
4

394.8

447.2

0.0

0.0

$197,611

$195,474

$334,773

$331,140

Costs:

0

0

0

$10,446

Mgt Ign Rx Fire Costs:

$230,260

$227,640

$171,000

$167,060

Total

$427,871

$423,114

$505,773

$508,646

Rx

Natural

Fire

Acreage:

0.0

115.6

Mgt Ign Rx Fire Acreage:
costs:
Rx
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Natural

Fire

Annual

Costs:

If the agency’s goal was simply to respond to and suppress or
manage each ignition at minimal cost, regardless of annual
burned area, alternative 2 would be the most cost-effective.
This result is due to the cost-saving advantages of containment
over control on most lower intensity tires and the expensive
outcomes that can result from trying to confine or manage
fires in the decadent fuelbeds.
If, however, the goal is to recreate the natural fire regime
average annual burned area), the
(i.e., to meet the
decision might be a little more involved. Alternative 2 would
still be the least expensive, but alternatives 3 and 4 would
require much less program or budgeted dollars to accomplish
the objective and result in much more of the acreage burning
under natural conditions (natural ignition sources and during
the natural fire season).
Containment or confinement strategies can only be used when
they are less expensive than controlling a given fire (USDA
Forest Service 1989). Table 1 shows that containment cost
less than control 56 percent of the times it was used and that
confinement cost less or about the same as control 78 percent
of the times it was used. This suggests that containment and
confinement are both feasible and cost-effective for our case
study ares.
Risk is incorporated into the analysis through the probability
of a fire resulting in excessive resource damages or
which cost over $850,000 to
suppression costs (e.g., fire
suppress regardless of the strategy used). However, none of
the confinement or prescribed natural fire responses resulted
in a catastrophic fire, and it could be argued that $953,000
(the most expensive gamed fire) is not really catastrophic
Fire.
when compared to historic fires like the 1966
The
Fire burned 93,600 acres of the case study area
and cost over $6.2 million (in 1988 dollars) to suppress. But,
Fire occurred under extreme site-specific
since the
weather conditions, it would receive a control response under
any alternative; and, since it became catastrophic despite
control efforts (the only possible response in 1966) it could
happen again under any alternative. The risk of another
catastrophic fire might seem greater under alternatives 3 and
4, since fires are allowed to get larger, but this is only the
short term risk factor. These alternatives would allow more
acres to bum under natural conditions, resulting in cleaner
bums than management ignited off-season fires and larger
breaks in the decadent fuelbeds, which should help to limit
the size of future fires.

SUMMARY
Developing cost-effective wilderness
management
programs is a dilemma faced by many Forest Service land
managers. Wilderness fire management is a requirement, but
the value of fire in wilderness remains undefinable in
monetary terms so it is excluded from most Forest Service
economic analyses. Therefore, cost-effectiveness analysis,
using the recreation of the natural fire regime as the
objective, can provide important economic information.
Decision trees help us predict future fire occurrence
potentials, and intensive gaming efforts help us estimate fire
sizes and costs associated with the implementation of
appropriate suppression responses and prescribed natural
fires. Case study results suggest that appropriate suppression
responses could provide cost-effective alternatives to current
control-oriented practices. Through this extensive and
thorough cost-effectiveness analysis we can, hopefully, avoid
some of the costly mistakes of past experiences in wilderness
fire management.
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